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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are Catholic organizations that represent
the interests of Catholic laity, workers, women, children, and LGBT people. Amici believe as a matter of
their deep Catholic faith that religious freedom is the
right of every person, Catholic, non-Catholic, female,
male, gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, worker, and
dependent. If the Petitioners receive the exemption
from the contraceptive benefit of the Affordable Care
Act that they request from this Court, hundreds of
thousands of Catholic and non-Catholic women and
their families across the country could be deprived of
their right to make their own decisions of conscience
about healthcare. Amici respectfully bring these employees’ voices to this Court, asking this Court to recognize that women’s reproductive rights and religious
liberty should not be defeated by a religious exemption that leaves contraceptive coverage unavailable to
women employees and their families.
If Petitioners are successful in this case, Catholic
Amici also anticipate that Catholic organizations –
schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and social
services agencies – will be pressured by the bishops to
1

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
No persons other than the Amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to this brief ’s preparation or submission. All
parties have consented in writing to the filing of this amicus
brief.
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oppose health insurance benefits for same-sex couples
and their dependents; refuse maternity care to single
women and married couples who bear children with
the aid of reproductive technology; deny adoptive children to gay and lesbian parents; and fire non-Catholic
and non-ministerial Catholic employees for getting
married, supporting same-sex marriage or reproductive rights, bearing children with the help of reproductive technology, using contraception, and exercising
other constitutional rights.
Catholics for Choice (CFC) represents the
majority of Catholics on issues of sexual and reproductive rights and health, and is the leading voice in
debates at the intersection of faith, women’s health,
reproductive choice, and religious liberty. Founded in
1973, CFC seeks to shape and advance sexual and
reproductive ethics that are based on justice, reflect a
commitment to women’s well-being, and respect and
affirm the capacity of women and men to make moral
decisions about their lives. CFC’s work promotes respect for the moral autonomy of every person, based
on the foundational Catholic teaching that every individual must follow his or her own conscience and
respect others’ right to do the same.
Call To Action is one of the largest organizations working for equality and justice in the Catholic
Church today. With over 25,000 members and supporters and 50 chapters nationally, Call To Action
educates, inspires and activates Catholics to act for
justice and build inclusive communities. In doing so,
Call To Action does not condone discrimination on the
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basis of sexual identity, conscience decisions, and/or
personal decision-making that does not conform to institutional Catholic dictates.
CORPUS is an international Catholic organization representing the vast majority of Roman Catholics seeking an inclusive priesthood. This inclusivity
affirms the human and reproductive rights of women
and men.
A Critical Mass: Women Celebrating Eucharist (ACM) is a community that empowers women in
the Roman Catholic tradition through dialogue and
liturgy. ACM is an open and welcoming community
that was born out of theological reflection, faith sharing, and desire for an inclusive role for women in the
Catholic Church.
DignityUSA was founded in 1969 and is an organization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) Catholics and supporters. Among the areas of
concern outlined in its Statement of Position and
Purpose is the promotion of “equal access and justice
in all areas of healthcare and healing.” DignityUSA is
concerned that LGBT people could be denied equal
access to healthcare services if employers are allowed
to restrict healthcare coverage on the basis of the
religious belief of the owners.
The National Coalition of American Nuns
(NCAN) began in 1969 to study and speak out on
issues of justice in church and society. Among other
things, NCAN calls on the Vatican to recognize
and work for women’s equality in civil and ecclesial
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matters, to support gay and lesbian rights, and to
promote the right of every woman to exercise her primacy of conscience in matters of reproductive justice.
New Ways Ministry represents Catholic lay
people, priests, and nuns who work to ensure that the
human dignity, freedom of conscience, and civil rights
of LGBT people are protected in all circumstances,
including in making decisions about healthcare. New
Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice and reconciliation for people and the wider Catholic Church. Through education and advocacy, New
Ways Ministry promotes the full equality of LGBT
people in church and society. New Ways Ministry’s
network includes Catholic parishes and college campuses throughout the United States.
The Quixote Center/Catholics Speak Out is a
faith-based organization that urges Catholics to take
adult responsibility for their lives. This includes making decisions according to one’s conscience regarding
reproductive rights.
The Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics
and Ritual (WATER) is a non-profit educational
organization made up of justice-seeking people, from
a variety of faith perspectives and backgrounds, who
promote the use of feminist religious values to make
social change. WATER believes that women’s health
decisions are private, and that the community’s responsibility is to make healthcare available for everyone. WATER participates in this amicus brief because
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a just society both respects privacy and promotes
health.
The Women’s Ordination Conference (WOC),
founded in 1975, is the oldest and largest national
organization that works to ordain women as priests,
deacons and bishops into an inclusive and accountable Catholic Church. WOC affirms women’s gifts,
openly and actively supports women’s voices, and recognizes and values all ministries that meet the spiritual needs and human rights of all people. WOC
promotes respect and self-determination of all people
based on personal discernment.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Catholic Amici believe as a matter of their
profound religious faith that religious freedom is a
universal right required by the dignity of the human
person. Because the fundamental human right to religious freedom is rooted in human dignity, Amici
believe that religious freedom is the right of every
person, Catholic and non-Catholic, female and male,
worker and dependent. See Second Vatican Council,
Declaration on Religious Freedom, in The Documents
of Vatican II 675, 679 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed.,
1966) (“[T]he right to religious freedom has its
foundation in the very dignity of the human person as
this dignity is known through the revealed word of
God and by reason itself.”); see also John Courtney
Murray, The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in
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Bridging the Sacred and the Secular 198-99 (J. Leon
Hooper ed., 1994) (“The foundation of the right [to
religious freedom] is the truth of human dignity.”). On
behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Catholic and
non-Catholic employees of religious organizations and
their dependents, Amici urge this Court to recognize
the religious freedom interests of those employees in
the birth control benefit of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) by rejecting the Petitioners’ request for a complete exemption from the requirement to provide this
important health insurance benefit.
“Among the reasons the United States is so open,
so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be
restricted or demeaned by government in exercising
his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees,
in protecting their own interests, interests the law
deems compelling.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq.,
does not require the Petitioners’ proposed restrictions
on the health and religious freedom interests of employees. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit them.
The Amici respectfully ask this Court to consider
the interests of more than 71 million Catholics in the
United States, 72 percent of whom support coverage
for birth control in both private and government-run
health insurance plans, and almost 80 percent of
whom believe that using contraception is morally
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acceptable. See P.J. Kenedy & Sons, The Official
Catholic Directory Anno Domini 2047-87 (2015);
Belden Russonello Strategists, Inc., Catholic Voters
and Religious Exemption Policies 9 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2014/documents/
11.17.14NationalCatholicVotersSurvey2014.pdf; Univision, Voice of the People (last visited Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.univision.com/noticias/la-huella-digital/lavoz-del-pueblo/matrix. Among sexually-active Catholic women, 99 percent have used contraception. See
Guttmacher Institute, Fact Sheet: Contraceptive
Use in the United States (Oct. 2015), http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html#6a; Catholics
for Choice, The Facts Tell The Story: Catholics and
Choice 4 (2014-2015), http://www.catholicsforchoice.
org/topics/catholicsandchoice/documents/FactsTellthe
Story2014.pdf. Additionally, in the realm of employment, the 17,755 Catholic parishes across the United
States employ thousands of workers. The 639 Catholic hospitals alone employ more than 516,410 fulltime employees and 220,795 part-time workers in
addition to the tens of thousands of workers employed
at the 438 ancillary care systems, medical centers,
sanatoriums and hospices. See Catholic Health Association of the United States, Catholic Health Care in
the United States 2 (Jan. 2016), https://www.chausa.
org/docs/default-source/general-files/cha_mini_profile
2016.pdf ?sfvrsn=2; Kenedy at 2047-87. The 233
Catholic colleges and universities in the United States
provide insurance coverage to hundreds of thousands
of workers and their dependents, and educate more
than 800,000 students. See Kenedy at 2047-87.

8
Although RFRA requires that these employees’
compelling interests in religious and reproductive
freedom be considered in any accommodation of their
employers’ religious freedom, Petitioners and their
Amici demand, not an accommodation, but a complete
exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This overbroad and total exemption would not only unduly
restrict Catholic and non-Catholic women employees
and their dependents from protecting their own compelling interests in religious and reproductive freedom, but also involve the government in restricting
and demeaning those employees’ exercise of religious
and reproductive freedom. Thus the Petitioners’ proposed exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which does
not permit “requests for religious accommodations
[that] become excessive, impose unjustified burdens
on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize an
institution’s effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s parallel
statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq.).
In the Catholic world alone, the proposed exemption could restrict equal access to contraception for
hundreds of thousands of workers and their dependents. To apply RFRA properly, this Court “must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.” Cutter,
544 U.S. at 720 (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). In this case, the burden on
nonbeneficiary employees is unconstitutionally broad;
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if this Court grants Petitioners’ exemption request,
thousands of women could immediately lose their right
of access to contraceptive insurance. In contrast to
Hobby Lobby, in this case there is no “existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework
to provide coverage,” and the “mechanism for doing so
is [not] already in place.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2786. Thus the burden on employees’ rights would be
immediate, excessive, and extreme if this Court were
to grant Petitioners’ request for a complete exemption
from the birth control benefit requirement.
This Court’s RFRA and RLUIPA “decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so
that it does not override other significant interests.”
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. Numerous significant interests are at stake in this case. In addition to the government’s “legitimate and compelling interest in the
health of female employees,” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2786, the employees have religious freedom and
reproductive freedom interests that will be negated if
their employers are completely exempted from this
provision of the ACA. An exemption for Petitioners
would serve no compelling interests for either the
government or the women affected. Moreover, under
RFRA, the government’s proposed accommodation is
the least restrictive means of furthering those specific
reproductive and religious interests of women employees. It is difficult to imagine a less restrictive
means than asking the Petitioners to do what they
have already done, namely publicly assert their

10
objection to contraception and tell the government
they do not want to pay for it.
Amici believe as a matter of their deep Catholic
faith that all employees are equally entitled to coverage of contraceptive services under the ACA, no matter where they work or what they believe. They also
believe that the least restrictive means of advancing
the critical ideals of religious liberty and women’s
equality would be to require all employers, including
churches and their integrated auxiliaries, to provide
access to contraception. They urge this Court to reject
Petitioners’ argument that the government’s exemption of churches and integrated auxiliaries mandates
an additional exemption for all religious organizations. If the government’s exemption of some churches but not other religious organizations violates
RFRA and the Religion Clauses, as Petitioners argue,
then the original exemption must be invalidated. An
unconstitutional remedy does not cure a constitutional violation, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 534 (1996), and a larger exemption does not
solve the constitutional problems with the smaller exemption that the government created here.
Moreover, under this Court’s precedents, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) lacked
the constitutional authority to exempt the churches
and their integrated auxiliaries from the ACA. King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). In these
circumstances, RFRA does not require the broader exemption requested by the Petitioners, and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit it.
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“At some point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp.
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987)
(quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached
here, where Petitioners reject every accommodation
offered by the government and demand a complete
exemption from the contraceptive benefit. Like the
Connecticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed]
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified
right not to work on whatever day they designate
as their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this
case violates the Establishment Clause through its
“unyielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations] over all other interests,” especially the interests of Catholic women in furthering their
reproductive health and protecting their religious
freedom. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at
722.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

RFRA REQUIRES THIS COURT TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE
EMPLOYEES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
WHO WOULD BE HARMED BY PETITIONERS’ EXEMPTION FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFIT REQUIREMENT.

This Court’s First Amendment cases have always
considered the effects of religious accommodations
on the well-being of third parties whose interests
might be affected by the accommodation. In Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., for example, this Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that gave Sabbatarians
an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath because the statute took “no account of the convenience
or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.” Caldor, 472 U.S.
at 709. Similarly, in United States v. Lee, this Court
rejected Amish employers’ requests for exemption
from paying social security taxes because the exemption “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith
on the employees.” 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
This Court has interpreted both RLUIPA and its
parallel statute, RFRA, to require the same analysis.
Prisoners do not enjoy an absolute right to religious
accommodations under RLUIPA. Their demands must
be weighed against the “burden a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries” and “measured so that [they do] not override other significant
interests.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 722. Courts enforcing RLUIPA must evaluate prison officials’ and other
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prisoners’ interests in an “appropriately balanced
way,” id. at 722, and reject inmate requests that “impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized
persons.” Id. at 726; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.
853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[A]ccommodating petitioner’s religious belief in this case
would not detrimentally affect others who do not
share petitioner’s belief.”).
Similarly, employers do not enjoy an absolute
right to religious accommodations under RFRA. In
Hobby Lobby, this Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that RFRA requires accommodations “no matter the impact that accommodation may have on
. . . thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby.”
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760; see also id. at 2783
(“Our decision should not be understood to hold that
an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall
if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”).
Vaccination-coverage requirements could be upheld
against religious employers, for example, in order to
protect third persons against the spread of infectious
diseases and increase herd immunity. Id. at 2783. In
other words, the religious freedom accommodations of
employers must not “unduly restrict other persons,
such as employees, in protecting their own interests,
interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 2786-87
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Petitioners’ requested exemption would inflict
numerous harms on Catholic women employees and
their dependents in an unbalanced manner that contradicts the RFRA framework. These harms are both
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material and dignitary. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva
B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J.
2516, 2566-78 (2015). The direct material harm is loss
of the preventive services healthcare to which both
the ACA and the government’s proposed accommodation entitle employees. If Petitioners receive their
exemption in this case, in contrast to Hobby Lobby,
there is no “existing, recognized, workable, and alreadyimplemented framework to provide coverage,” and
the “mechanism for doing so is [not] already in place.”
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786. Thus the burden on
women employees’ rights would be immediate, excessive, and extreme.
In contrast to this case, in Hobby Lobby the
burden on women was “precisely zero.” Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2760. If Petitioners receive their exemption from this Court, in the Catholic world alone
hundreds of thousands of employees and their dependents could lose access to contraceptive coverage.
See generally Kenedy. Every employee of a Catholic
organization in the United States could face the
dilemma of “Sandra,” a science teacher at a Catholic
school in the Midwest who did not want her real
name revealed. Sandra’s careful financial planning
with her husband about the costs of their insurance
coverage unraveled because her insurance did not
cover birth control. For the hundreds of thousands
of employees of Catholic institutions nationwide,
like Sandra and the other 163,000 lay teachers at
Catholic elementary and high schools, whose family
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budgets are directly tied to their insurance coverage,
the burden of out-of-pocket costs for “birth control is a
lot of extra money.” Catholics for Choice, Comments
Re: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care
Act 4 (Jun. 19, 2012), http://www.catholicsforchoice.
org/news/pr/2012/documents/6.19.2012CatholicsforChoice
Comments_CMS-9968-ANPRM.pdf.
This Court has long recognized the dignitary
harms associated with the “deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.” Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291-92
(1964). Private Catholic employees suffer similar dignitary harms whenever the government authorizes
their employers to deny them access to benefits enjoyed by their fellow citizens. On the subject of contraceptive access, in particular, the “refusal to furnish
insurance covering contraception [inaccurately] labels
an entire group of employees – women using certain
contraceptives – as sinners.” Nejaime & Siegel at
2575-76. Petitioners may believe that women who
choose contraception are sinners; they are not entitled to government ratification and enforcement of
their belief. Employees have the constitutional right
to make moral decisions in good conscience about
what is best for their personal health and their families’ well being. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (use of contraception falls within the zone
of privacy protected by the Constitution).
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Such denial of benefits also degrades the dignitary free exercise rights of employees, which are
protected by both the Constitution and the teachings
of the Catholic church. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2785 (“free exercise is essential in preserving
. . . dignity”) with Second Vatican Council at 679
(“[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation
in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and
by reason itself.”).
The Petitioners’ proposed exemption is especially
“stigmatiz[ing] and demean[ing]” to Catholic women.
Nejaime & Siegel at 2576. Since the 1960s, American
Catholic women have used contraception in numbers
that match their non-Catholic counterparts. They
continue to do so now, even though, from the moment
the government proposed the contraceptive coverage
benefit, some of the Petitioners requested a complete
exemption from the benefit because they believe
contraception is always immoral. See Laura Bassett,
The Men Behind the War on Women, Huffington Post,
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/
01/the-men-behind-the-war-on_n_1069406.html; Leslie
C. Griffin, The Catholic Bishops vs. the Contraceptive
Mandate, 6 Religions 1411, 1415 (2015), http://www.
mdpi.com/2077-1444/6/4/1411.
Both Catholic and non-Catholic women suffer
dignitary harm whenever the government’s exemptions and accommodations confer its imprimatur on
the Catholic hierarchy’s decree that the use of contraception is morally forbidden to all, Catholic and
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non-Catholic alike. Just as “the bakery owner who
turns away a same-sex couple treats that particular
couple as sinners,” the proposed exemption stigmatizes and demeans Catholic women by confirming,
with government approval, their employers’ notion
that women who use contraception act immorally.
Nejaime & Siegel at 2576.
A strong majority of Catholic women (79 percent)
have rejected the idea that the use of contraception is
morally wrong, instead choosing in good conscience to
make their own decisions about their personal health
and family size. See Univision. RFRA does not require
the government to allow employers to put employees
in disadvantageous positions. RFRA does not require
employers’ religious beliefs to trump those of their
employees. That is not the way RFRA should work.
See Oral Arg. Tr. at 33, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) (Justice
Kennedy: “[I]n a way, the employees are in a position
where the government, through its healthcare plans,
is – is, under your view, is – is allowing the employer
to put the employee in a disadvantageous position.
The employee may not agree with these religious –
religious beliefs of the employer. Does the religious
beliefs just trump? Is that the way it works?”).
The religious freedom rights of women employees
of Catholic institutions also provide a compelling
government interest that must be part of the RFRA
analysis in this case.

18
II.

THE GOVERNMENT’S ACCOMMODATION
WAS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
TO PROTECT ITS COMPELLING INTERESTS IN THE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF WOMEN
EMPLOYEES OF CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.

This Court has repeatedly held that “[c]ontext
matters” in the application of the compelling governmental interest standard. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723;
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). In this case, the context
includes the rights of women employees and their
dependents to access contraceptive insurance coverage. Therefore the heavy burden on nonbeneficiary
women’s reproductive and religious freedom must
“inform the analysis of the Government’s compelling
interest and the availability of a less restrictive
means of advancing that interest.” Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.
This Court has already recognized that the
birth control benefit “furthers a legitimate and compelling interest in the health of female employees.”
Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The experience
of Catholic and non-Catholic women employees demonstrates that the government has an additional compelling interest in protecting the religious freedom of
employees who believe that their faith allows contraceptive use. Because the Petitioners’ proposed exemption “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith
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on the employees,” it must be rejected. Lee, 455 U.S.
at 261.
From the time HHS first proposed the birth
control benefit, Petitioners requested the complete
exemption that the government eventually granted to
churches and their integrated auxiliaries. See 26
U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a)
(defining the federal government’s complete exemption of “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches,” as well as
the “exclusively religious activities of any religious
order” from the benefit). HHS’s repeated redrafting
and reconsideration of both exemptions and accommodations to the contraceptive benefit requirement
demonstrated the government’s concern about the effects of either an exemption or an accommodation on
employees’ religious freedom. During the drafting of
the church exemption, the government struggled to
find the right language to protect the religious freedom rights of employees. Id. The government first
justified the exemption by asserting that churches
and integrated auxiliaries are “more likely than other
employers to employ people of the same faith who
share the same objection,” 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874
(Jul. 2, 2013), but then later removed a requirement
that the exempted institutions primarily employ only
people who share their faith. Id. at 39,873.
The history of this notice-and-comment process
confirms that the government had a compelling interest in protecting all employees’ religious liberty
throughout the development of the accommodation
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that Petitioners challenge in this case. The government has thus met its heavy burden to “ ‘show with
more particularity how its admittedly strong interest
. . . would be adversely affected by granting an exemption.’ ” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431. In contrast to
the government’s efforts, Petitioners’ proposed total
exemption protects neither the compelling interest in
women’s equality nor the compelling interest in
women’s religious liberty.
The government’s compelling interest in employees’ religious freedom informs the least restrictive
means analysis required by RFRA. The accommodation, which only requires Petitioners to inform the
government of their opposition to the contraceptive
benefit and to provide minimal information about
their insurance carriers, is the least restrictive means
of respecting both Petitioners’ religious freedom and
all employees’ rights not to be shut out of the insurance marketplace because of their employers’ religious beliefs.
The government’s numerous efforts to accommodate the Petitioners while protecting employees’
rights demonstrate that, in this case, in contrast to
Hobby Lobby:
[T]here is no less restrictive, equally effective
means that would both (1) satisfy the challengers’ religious objections to providing insurance coverage for certain contraceptives
. . . ; and (2) carry out the objective of the
ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement, to
ensure that women employees receive, at no
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cost to them, the preventive care needed to
safeguard their health and well being.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 868 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the Court’s opinion suggests that prison officials must refute every conceivable option to satisfy RLUIPA’s least restrictive
means requirement.”); Nejaime & Siegel at 2580-81
(“If religious accommodation (1) would inflict material
or dignitary harm on those the statute is designed to
protect or (2) would produce effects and meanings
that undermine the government’s society-wide objectives, this impact is evidence that unimpaired enforcement of the law is the least restrictive means of
furthering the government’s interest.”).
In this case, moreover, it is difficult to imagine a
less restrictive means than asking the Petitioners to
do what they have already done, namely publicly assert their objection to contraception and tell the government they do not want to pay for it.
III. THE CHURCH EXEMPTION DOES NOT
PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
PETITIONERS’ COMPLETE EXEMPTION
FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT.
During the notice-and-comments period about
HHS’s proposed regulations regarding the coverage of
preventive services under the ACA, Amicus Catholics
for Choice (CFC) expressed its objections to granting
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any institution or organization permission to deny its
workers contraceptive coverage, or to require workers
to navigate a complicated series of obstacles in order
to obtain coverage. See Catholics for Choice, Comments Re: NPRM: Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.
catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2013/documents/04.08.2013
CatholicsforChoiceComments-CMS-9968-P.pdf. Amici
remain convinced that completely excluding any woman from equal access to contraception undermines the
government’s equally compelling interests of protecting religious liberty and advancing women’s equality.
Any exemption draws arbitrary lines between those
women whose consciences are worthy of respect and
those deemed unworthy.
In comments submitted to HHS, CFC expressed
its specific concern about the thousands of women
already left completely out of contraceptive coverage
by the church exemption, and the additional hundreds of thousands of employees threatened by the
proposed accommodation. Id. CFC noted that the federal government’s complete exemption of “churches,
their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches,” as well as the “exclusively religious activities of any religious order” from the
birth control benefit would restrict the rights of numerous women church workers who make their own
decisions of conscience about contraception. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a). The gardeners, secretaries, cleaners, cooks, and many others
who work for the 17,755 parish churches around the

23
country should enjoy the same freedom as other
American women to make decisions about their
health and family size.
Also troubling to Amici is the government’s initial rationale for the church exemption. HHS first
asserted that churches and integrated auxiliaries are
“more likely than other employers to employ people of
the same faith who share the same objection, and
who would therefore be less likely than other people
to use contraceptive services even if such services
were covered under their plan.” 78 Fed. Reg. at
39,874. This argument was falsely premised on the
idea that members of the world’s religions always
agree internally about morality. More specifically,
the government’s assertion was factually inaccurate
about Catholic parishes, dioceses, convents, and many
other Catholic workplaces. Since the 1960s, American
Catholic women have used contraception in numbers
that match their non-Catholic counterparts. Griffin at
1415. Among sexually-active Catholic women, 99
percent have used a form of contraception opposed by
the Catholic hierarchy. See Guttmacher Institute;
Catholics for Choice, The Facts at 2. Clearly, Catholic
women dissent in large numbers from the teaching of
their church’s hierarchy that contraceptive use is
always wrong. Thus the rationale of the government’s
church exemption was flawed ab initio.
Amici’s fears about the original exemption were
also buttressed by the very public role of the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB),
who, from the beginning of the discussion of the

24
contraceptive benefit, requested an exemption for
all Catholic employers – from parishes to dioceses,
schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and social
services agencies. The bishops developed an extensive
lobbying campaign to persuade the Obama administration to cease the alleged war on religious liberty
that the birth control benefit was supposed to represent. President Obama even met with New York’s
Archbishop Timothy Dolan, then president of the
USCCB, to discuss the “religious liberty issue.” See
Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Open “Religious Liberty”
Drive, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2011, at A14; see also Sara
Hutchinson, It’s A Matter of Conscience, Albany Times
Union, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.catholicsforchoice.
org/news/op-eds/2012/Itsamatterofconscience.asp. The
bishops, however, were advocating for their own
religious beliefs; they do not represent the views of
the Catholic people on the morality of contraception.
The Catholic employees’ perspective on their own
religious freedom was not reflected in the exemption.
Griffin at 1415.
The bishops’ desired exemption included not only
religious and secular nonprofit and for-profit employers, but also insurance companies and individual
employees who did not want to participate in an
insurance plan that sponsored contraceptive coverage. See Office of the General Counsel, Letter [to
HHS] Re: Interim Final Rules on Preventive Services
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/generalcounsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventiveservices-2011-08-2.pdf. Were the bishops to get their
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way, the number of affected employees could be enormous. In Petitioner Zubik’s single diocese of Pittsburgh alone, for example, 165 Catholic non-profit
organizations could subject their employees to this
exclusion. Fifty of these organizations employ nearly
8,600 workers, and the 88 Catholic elementary and
high schools together employ 1,503 lay teachers. See
Kenedy at 1069-73, 2075. For the 233 Catholic colleges and universities in the United States that alone
employ nearly three-quarters of a million workers
and enroll over 800,000 students, the loss of benefits
could be tremendous. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v.
Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2015) (At the
University of Notre Dame alone, “Meritain administers coverage for some 4600 employees of Notre Dame
(out of a total of 5200) and 6400 dependents of employees. Aetna insures 2600 students and 100 dependents.” Although Notre Dame is not a party to
this case, Notre Dame has challenged the same accommodation as Petitioners.); Brief Amicus Curiae of
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. in
Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119
& 15-191, at 25 (filed Jan. 8, 2016) (identifying numbers of Catholic students).
Because Catholic women overwhelmingly disagree with the Catholic hierarchy about the morality
of contraception, Amici agree with Petitioners that
the church and integrated auxiliary exemption is
arbitrary and utterly irrational. See Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453 & 14-1505 [Pet’rs’
Brief I], at 55, 57, 59 (filed Jan. 4, 2016); Brief for
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Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119 & 15-191
[Pet’rs’ Brief II], at 64-66 (filed Jan. 4, 2016). The
exemption harms Catholic women’s religious liberty
interest in making their own decisions about contraceptive use. The exemption places the government on
the Catholic hierarchy’s side of an internal religious
liberty debate, particularly harming the employees
who work at the 17,755 Catholic parishes and 171
dioceses across the United States. See Kenedy at
2047-87. Moreover, the exemption does not even consider the religious freedom of non-Catholic employees
of parishes and dioceses. In contrast, Amici’s Catholic
faith teaches them to respect and protect nonCatholics’ religious freedom equally with their own.
Amici disagree with Petitioners, however, about
the appropriate remedy that RFRA requires for the
flawed exemption developed by the Department of
Health and Human Services. Petitioners argue that
the original exemption should be expanded even further. That proposed solution violates separation of
powers principles. As Justice Kennedy suggested during Hobby Lobby’s oral argument:
[W]hat kind of constitutional structure do
we have if the Congress can give an agency
the power to grant or not grant a religious
exemption based on what the agency determined? . . . [W]hen we have a First
Amendment issue of this consequence,
shouldn’t we indicate that it’s for the Congress, not the agency[,] to determine [who
gets the exemption]?
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Oral Arg. Tr. at 56-57, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); see also
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would
have done so expressly”).
In these circumstances, it is neither the Petitioners’ nor this Court’s job to rewrite the exemption
in any way, whether to broaden it to include all
religious organizations or to make it consistent with
the way Congress drafted the exemption of certain
religious employers in Title VII. See Pet’rs’ Brief II 40
(suggesting Title VII’s statutory language as a model
for analysis in this case). Congress’ clear intent in the
ACA was to “require[ ] an employer’s group health
plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish
‘preventive care and screenings’ for women without
‘any cost sharing requirements.’ ” Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
The Petitioners’ proposed expanded exemption is not
consistent with Congress’ stated goals to provide
preventive healthcare services to all women.
An unconstitutional remedy does not cure a
constitutional violation. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
A larger exemption drafted by Petitioners or this
Court would not solve the problems associated with
a smaller one. It would also usurp Congress’ legitimate role in developing accommodations that treat
all religions equally, thereby allowing Petitioners to
become a law unto themselves. See Employment Div.,
Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990) (“[L]eaving accommodation to the
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political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs.”).
In addition, in this case, piling one exemption
upon another would violate the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment.
IV. INTERPRETING RFRA TO REQUIRE THE
PETITIONERS’ REQUESTED EXEMPTION
WOULD VIOLATE THE RELIGION CLAUSES
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
This Court has distinguished between religious
exemptions and accommodations, which are permitted by the “play in the joints” between the Religion
Clauses, and religious preferences, which the Establishment Clause prohibits. Compare Amos, 483 U.S.
at 335, with Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10. The government must heed this Court’s warning that “[a]t some
point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful
fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment
Clause. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (quoting Hobbie,
480 U.S. at 145); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 587 (1992) (“The principle that government may
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by
the Establishment Clause.”). The point of unlawful
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fostering of religion is reached with Petitioners’ proposed exemption.
In Cutter, this Court observed that a religious
exemption may violate the Establishment Clause in
three different situations: if it does not take account
of the burden of the exemption on nonbeneficiaries, if
it is not applied neutrally among faiths, or if it gives
an “unyielding” preference to religion. 544 U.S. at
720; see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722 (1994) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“[A] religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so
burden nonadherents or so discriminate against other
religions as to become an establishment.”). The Petitioners’ requested exemption violates all three standards.
First, as Amici explained in Part I, the exemption
completely ignores the material and dignitary harm
to nonbeneficiary employees who have health, reproductive freedom, and religious freedom interests in
equal access to contraception under the law. The proposed exemption’s failure to take account of these
third-party interests not only defeats Petitioners’
RFRA claim, but also violates the Establishment
Clause by giving a preference to employers’ religious
interests over employees’ religious interests. This
case can therefore be distinguished from this Court’s
other decisions upholding exemptions, which generally “involve legislative exemptions that did not, or
would not, impose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries while allowing others to act according to
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their religious beliefs.” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
Second, as Petitioners’ Briefs demonstrated in exquisite detail, HHS’s church exemption favors some
religious employers over others in a non-neutral and
incoherent fashion. See Pet’rs’ Brief II 65 (“So, for
example, a Unitarian Universalist church can decline
to provide contraceptive coverage even if it has no
religious objection and instead excludes the coverage
purely for reasons of cost or convenience. The government is thus in the odd position of denying an
exemption to some religious employers with sincere
religious objections to the mandate, while exempting
other religious employers who have no religiousbased objection to the mandate.”); Pet’rs’ Brief I 55
(“The Government has also already decided to exempt
certain religious organizations, and it has no legitimate justification – much less a compelling justification – for forcing other equally religious organizations
to comply.”). Broadening the exemption would not increase neutrality, as the Petitioners suggest. Instead,
the proposed total exemption would unconstitutionally “advanc[e] religion” and “provide unjustifiable
awards of assistance to religious organizations” at the
expense of women’s reproductive and religious freedom rights. Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
The reasonable Catholic observers represented
by Amici urge this Court to consider that such a
broad exemption would endorse the employers’ religion over that of employees in a non-neutral manner
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in violation of the most fundamental principles of the
Religion Clauses. See id. (“To ascertain whether the
statute conveys a message of endorsement, the relevant issue is how it would be perceived by an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute.”).
Third, the Petitioners’ proposed exemption gives
an “unyielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations] over all other interests,” especially the
equally important religious interests of Catholic and
non-Catholic women employees to make their own
decisions of faith about contraception. Caldor, 472
U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. Thus, just like
the Amish employers’ Free Exercise request for an
exemption from paying social security taxes, Petitioners’ proposed exemption must be rejected because
it “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith
on the employees.” Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. Moreover,
just like the Connecticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed] Sabbath observers with an absolute
and unqualified right not to work on whatever day
they designate as their Sabbath,” Caldor, 472 U.S. at
709, the requested exemption in this case violates
the Establishment Clause by giving an unyielding
weighting to the Catholic hierarchy’s religious interests over both the interests of Catholics who in good
conscience disagree about the use of contraception as
well as the interests of non-Catholic employees who
work for Catholic organizations.
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In Caldor, this Court approvingly identified “a
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well
articulated by Judge Learned Hand”:
“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the
right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to
his own religious necessities.”
Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
Amici endorse this constitutional principle as a matter of faith; as Catholics, Amici believe that every
person must enjoy “freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious.” Second Vatican Council at
681. Nonetheless, this coercion is precisely what Petitioners demand in this case: the right to insist that
Catholic women conform their conduct to the interests of their church’s hierarchy instead of to their own
personal religious necessities. In defiance of the First
Amendment, Petitioners request an “absolute and
unqualified” exemption where “religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests in the
workplace,” “no matter what burden or inconvenience
this imposes on the . . . workers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at
709-10.
Neither RFRA nor the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment grants Petitioners a right to
exemption from the ACA, and the Establishment
Clause prohibits it. The exemption does not take account of the burden on nonbeneficiaries, is not applied
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neutrally among faiths, and gives an “unyielding”
preference to religion. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
Amici urge this Court to consider that a grant
of Petitioners’ requested exemption by this Court
would result in a precedent of “startling breadth” that
could threaten Catholic workers’ rights outside the
contraceptive insurance context and compound the
Establishment Clause violation already requested by
Petitioners. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If Petitioners are successful in
this case, Amici anticipate that Catholic organizations – schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and
social services agencies – will be pressured by the
bishops to oppose health insurance benefits for samesex couples and their dependents; refuse maternity
care to single women and married couples who bear
children with the aid of reproductive technology; deny
adoptive children to gay and lesbian parents; and fire
non-Catholic and non-ministerial Catholic employees
for getting married, supporting same-sex marriage or
reproductive rights, bearing children with the help of
reproductive technology, using contraception, and
exercising other constitutional rights. See, e.g., Ray
Long et al., Gay Marriage Bill Off to Rough Start,
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 3, 2013, at C4 (voicing Catholic
objection that religious organizations would have to
“provide health insurance to an employee’s same-sex
spouse”); Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc.,
48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc.,
772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (Catholic school fired
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married non-ministerial schoolteacher for using in
vitro fertilization); Brief Amicus Curiae of United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops at 10 (recording bishops’ objections to providing adoptive children
to same-sex couples); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 30, 2013) (Catholic school fired non-Catholic
Computer Technology Coordinator for use of artificial
insemination); David-Elijah Nahmod, Assembly Panel
Holds Hearing on Religious Workers’ Rights, Bay Area
Reporter, Jul. 30, 2015, http://www.ebar.com/news/
article.php?sec=news&article=70789 (San Francisco
archbishop tries to require non-Catholic and nonministerial employees to sign an employment contract stating they are ministers who may not violate
Catholic sexual norms); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad.,
No. NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042 (Mass. Super.
Dec. 16, 2015) (private Catholic school for girls revoked job offer to Food Service Director after he listed
his husband as an emergency contact).
The best way to prevent RFRA from acquiring
such “breadth and sweep” is for this Court “to ensure
that interests in religious freedom are protected.”
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Amici respectfully ask this Court to ensure that
the religious interests of Catholic and non-Catholic
workers and their dependents are protected so that
they may “preserv[e] their own dignity” and “striv[e]
for a self-definition shaped by their religious precepts.” Id.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The Amici Curiae – Catholics for Choice, Call to
Action, CORPUS, A Critical Mass, DignityUSA, the
National Coalition of American Nuns, New Ways
Ministry, the Quixote Center/Catholics Speak Out,
the Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual,
and the Women’s Ordination Conference – respectfully ask this Court to reject Petitioners’ demand for a
complete exemption from providing the birth control
benefit of the Affordable Care Act and to affirm the
judgments of the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.
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